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Abstract
Valuable items are often remembered better than less valuable items, 
but research on the mechanisms supporting this value effect is limited. In the
current study, we sought to determine how items might be differentially 
encoded based on their value. In Experiment 1, participants studied words 
associated with point-values which were followed by a cue to either 
“Remember” the word for a later test or “Forget” the word. While to-be-
forgotten words were recognized at a lower rate than to-be-remembered 
words, there was a significant effect of value for to-be-forgotten words when 
the “Forget” cue was presented immediately after the word, suggesting a 
relatively automatic enhancement of encoding by value. In Experiment 2, we
examined to what extent subjects engage in more effective encoding 
strategies for high-value items. Subjects studied a list of words with different 
point-values, and were instructed either to construct a mental image of the 
item, use rote rehearsal to learn the items, or were not given any study 
strategy. There were significant effects of value for items that were studied 
under rote rehearsal or when no strategy instruction was given. However, 
effects of value were nearly eliminated when subjects used a mental imagery
strategy for all items as this strategy boosted memory for low-value items. In
Experiment 3, we sought to replicate Experiment 2 with a different deep 
encoding manipulation. Subjects were instructed to generate and say aloud a
sentence containing each item. Consistent with Experiment 2, this 
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manipulation eliminated the effects of value on recognition memory. Thus, it 
appears that subjects engage in more effective encoding strategies for high-
value words because the benefit of value was substantially reduced when 
subjects were instructed to use deep encoding strategies. Together, these 
results suggest that valuable items are encoded more effectively due to both
automatic and strategic mechanisms. 
Keywords: recognition; memory; value; recollection; strategy; directed-
forgetting
Word Count: 6576
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When more information is present than can be remembered, learners 
typically selectively encode valuable items at the expense of less important 
ones (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; Ariel, 
Price, and Hertzog, 2015). Selective encoding is used frequently in everyday 
life, such as attempting to remember one’s grocery list or focusing on 
important information in a textbook chapter. In free recall and recognition 
testing, items are more likely to be remembered when paired with a high 
monetary-value or point-value at study (i.e., where goal is to earn a high 
score) (Adcock et al., 2006; Castel, Murayama, Friedman, McGillivray, & Link,
2013; Cohen, Rissman, Suthana, Castel, & Knowlton, 2016; Mason, Farrell, 
Howard-Jones, & Ludwig, 2017; Shigemune, Tsukiura, Kambara, & 
Kawashima, 2014; Spaniol, Schain, & Bowen, 2013; Stefanidi, Ellis, & Brewer,
2018; Wolosin, Zeithamova, & Preston, 2012). This phenomenon has been 
labeled value-directed remembering (e.g., Castel, Benjamin, Craik, & 
Watkins, 2002). On one hand, people may be strategic and engage in 
deeper, more effective encoding of information they deem to be important to
remember. For example, after a delicious meal one may try to “make a 
mental note” of the restaurant so it can be revisited. On the other hand, 
valuable information may be automatically strengthened in memory through 
effects of reward on memory representations. For example, a delicious meal 
may be remembered well because of the rewarding and pleasurable aspects 
of the experience even if no effort is made to encode the memory 
effectively. This more automatic effect of value is supported by a wide 
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literature showing that valuable items are better remembered even when 
encoding is incidental (Madan & Spetch, 2012; Mather & Schoeke, 2011; 
Murayama & Kitagami, 2014) or an implicit memory test is administered 
(Madan, Fujiwara, Gerson, & Caplan, 2012). These two mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive, and it is possible that the two contribute differentially 
depending on the circumstances. 
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Potential Mechanisms Supporting Value-Directed Remembering
Research on explicit strategy use during the selective encoding of 
valuable material is somewhat limited. In Ariel, Price, and Hertzog (2015) 
both younger and older adults reported using more elaborative encoding 
strategies when learning high-value word pairs (i.e., mental imagery, putting 
items in a sentence), and using these strategies was associated with better 
recall than simple rote rehearsal. These elaborative strategies use deeper 
semantic and associative processing, which produces a stronger memory 
trace (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Richardson, 1998). In Cohen, Rissman, 
Hovhannisyan, Castel, and Knowlton (2017), a large proportion of 
participants also reported using different mnemonic strategies based on 
item-value. Interestingly, many of these participants reported that they did 
not even attempt to selectively learn valuable items, but despite this 
supposed indifference to value, they still exhibited better memory for 
valuable material. This suggests that although learners often differentially 
employ mnemonic strategies based on item-value, some of the benefits of 
value are likely independent of strategy use. 
Although it is possible value enhances memory primarily due to 
deeper, elaborative encoding, another possibility is that valuable items are 
selectively-attended, resulting in increased mental rehearsal. Indeed, when 
participants are given a limited time to study items differing in value, they 
will allocate a substantially disproportionate amount of time to studying the 
highest-value items (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Ariel, Price, & Hertzog, 
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2015; Castel et al., 2013). This allocation of study-time coincides with 
enhanced retrieval of the valuable items (Castel et al., 2013), and suggests 
that this value-related selective-attention is often intentional. According to 
the agenda-based regulation framework of study-time allocation, time, 
resources and effort are allocated based on a goal-oriented agenda that aims
to maximize performance (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Dunlosky & Ariel, 
2011). Thus, if one can only remember a subset of the items being studied, 
the agenda will favor allocation of these things towards the most valuable 
items. In line with this framework, a commonly reported strategy is to ignore 
low-value items resulting in higher scores (Ariel, Price, & Hertzog, 2015; 
Robison & Unsworth, 2017). Additionally, valuable items may benefit from 
enhanced semantic processing. High-value cues have been shown to result 
in increased activity in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), pre-
supplementary motor area, and posterior lateral temporal cortex (Cohen, 
Rissman, Suthana, Castel, & Knowlton, 2014; Cohen et al., 2016). These 
three regions have all been associated with deep semantic processing 
(Binder et al., 2009; Binder and Desai, 2011). In Cohen et al. (2016), younger
adults who effectively increased activity in these regions for valuable items 
showed the strongest benefits of value, whereas older adults who decreased 
activity for low-value items performed best. It has not yet been determined 
whether such semantic processing differences are due to conscious strategy 
use.
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Whereas the above literature suggests that value’s effect on memory 
is supported by learners’ intentional use of agenda-based encoding 
strategies and selective direction of attention, other researchers have 
focused on mechanisms that may support value’s effect on memory in a 
relatively automatic fashion based on proximity to reward or value. Much of 
this work follows from studies of the mesolimbic reward system, suggesting 
that activity in these dopaminergic regions is increased for valuable items 
compared to less valuable items, which promotes the consolidation of 
memory for valuable items (Adcock et al., 2006; Carter, MacInnes, Huettel, &
Adcock, 2009; Spaniol, Schain, & Bowen, 2013). More specifically, the 
nucleus accumbens and ventral tegmental area (VTA) are activated in 
response to high-value cues and this response is thought to underlie 
anticipation of large gains and losses (Carter et al., 2009). According to one 
popular hypothesis, dopaminergic signaling from the VTA in response to 
rewarding stimuli modulates hippocampal activity, and this signaling strongly
influences whether new learning is persistently stored in long-term memory 
(Bethus, Tse, & Morris, 2010; Rossato, Bevilaqua, Izquierdo, Medina, & 
Cammarota, 2009; see Sugrue, Corrado, & Newsome, 2005 for a review). 
Overview of the Current Experiment
In the current study, we sought to determine the contributions of 
strategic and automatic encoding mechanisms in value-directed recognition. 
One method of examining the relative contribution of different encoding 
mechanisms was devised by Gardiner, Gawlik, and Richardson-Klavehn 
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(1994), who used a directed-forgetting procedure with a cue to remember or 
forget the word presented either immediately or a few seconds after the 
word was presented. In this way, the effects of directed-forgetting could be 
measured, as well as the effects of elaborative encoding, which occurred 
when participants received a cue to remember immediately after the item 
was presented. When the cue was delayed, participants appeared to engage 
in maintenance rehearsal until the cue was presented, with little time for 
further elaborative rehearsal before the next item appeared. In Experiment 1
we used a similar directed-forgetting paradigm where each item was 
designated as to-be-remembered (TBR) or to-be-forgotten (TBF) after a 
variable delay during study, and then both TBR and TBF items were 
presented at test. The learn cue was either presented immediately after the 
word or after a 5 s delay, and value was manipulated by pairing each item 
with a point-value (3 or 12 pts.) that would be earned for later recognition. 
Delaying the cue leads participants to primarily keep an item in mind 
through maintenance rehearsal, as it is not in their interest to expend 
cognitive resources elaborately encoding the item when a forget cue may 
appear (Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1994; Woodward, Bjork, 
Jongeward, 1973). Thus, trials with a delayed cue encourage increased 
maintenance encoding at the expense of elaborative encoding. In contrast, 
an immediate “Remember” cue encourages elaborative encoding, as 
evidenced by improved recollection (Gardiner, Gawlik, and Richardson-
Klavehn, 1994). Thus, if value’s effect on recognition is primarily due to 
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increased maintenance rehearsal, valuable items should be remembered 
relatively better when the directed-forgetting cue is delayed, whereas if 
participants engage in more elaborative encoding for high-value items, this 
effect should be greatest for items with an immediate Remember cue. 
Finally, if value’s effect on recognition is largely automatic, this would be 
observable by value enhancing memory despite an immediate forget cue. 
Based on the findings of Ariel, Price, and Hertzog (2015) and Cohen et al. 
(2017), we hypothesized that value effects would be most pronounced on 
trials supporting elaborative encoding.  
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Data from 34 undergraduate students from University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) were collected. Two participants were excluded from all 
analyses for having recognition sensitivity (see Data Analysis section) more 
than 2.5 standard deviations below average, resulting in a total sample size 
of 32 (23 women and 9 men). Their age range was 18-38 (M = 21.50, SD = 
3.46). This sample size was selected as it would allow for an approximate 
power of .81 to detect a medium-sized effect, as computed using GPower 
(version 3.0; Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf; 
http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html). These participants completed the study 
for course credit. Informed consent was acquired and the study was 
completed in accordance with UCLA’s Institutional Review Board. 
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Materials
Stimuli consisted of 96 six-letter English words, including nouns, 
adjectives, and verbs. These words were selected to have a similar 
frequency (M = 4466.12 occurrences per million, SD = 237.11) in the 
Hyperspace Analogue to Language corpus (Lund & Burgess, 1996). During 
encoding, 48 of these words were randomly presented and paired with a 
point-value of 3 or 12 presented to the right of the word (e.g., “rivers 3”). 
These values were chosen to maximize the difference between low (3 pts.) 
and high (12 pts.) value items while only having two options for later source 
retrieval. Each word was printed in either red (RGB value: 255, 0, 0) or blue 
(RGB value: 0, 0, 255). Participants were not asked to memorize the point-
value or word color; these details were used to assess incidental memory. 
Finally, each word was associated with either a learn (“LLLL”) or forget 
(“FFFF”) cue. Of the 48 study items, each possible point-value x word color x 
learn cue combination was assigned an equal number of trials, and all words 
were randomly assigned to each of these variable combinations or to be a 
new item at testing. During the recognition test all 96 words (half new) were 
presented in random order without a point-value and printed in black ink. All 
materials were designed and presented on a desktop computer using the 
Collector program (Gikeymarcia/Collector, n.d.; 
https://github.com/gikeymarcia/Collector). All words were printed in 29 pt. 
Open Sans font with a white background. 
Procedure
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
 FORGET ME NOT  12
Participants completed the study individually in a private computer lab.
They were told they would view a large number of words, each paired with a 
point-value they would earn if they could remember the item, and that their 
goal was to maximize their score. They were told that items paired with a 
learn cue (“LLLL”) were to be learned for a later memory test and items 
paired with a forget cue (“FFFF”) could be forgotten. Each of the 48 study 
items were split into two cue delay blocks. In the short cue delay block, all 
items were presented individually for 2 s each, a learn/forget cue was 
presented for 1 s, and then there was a fixation cross for 5 s (Figure 1). In 
the long delay block, the order of the learn/forget cue and fixation cross were
reversed, though the total duration of encoding was equal. Whether the long 
delay or short delay block was presented first was counterbalanced across 
participants. After encoding, a brief distractor task was completed to reduce 
additional rehearsal, which consisted of 10 simple multiplication and division 
problems. 
Finally, a self-paced recognition test was completed. Participants were 
informed that they should disregard that some items were previously paired 
with a forget cue, as they would still earn their associated points. 
Additionally, to discourage them labeling all items as old, they were told they
would lose 2 points for incorrect responses and to answer as accurately as 
possible. Participants first rated how confident they were that each item was 
or was not presented before on a 6-point scale: 1 “Definitely NEW”, 2 
“Probably NEW”, 3 “Maybe NEW”, 4 “Maybe OLD”, 5 “Probably OLD”, or 6 
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“Definitely OLD”. For items rated as old (4-6), they then reported whether 
each item was worth 3 or 12 points and whether it was printed in red or blue 
ink. For items rated as new (1-3), they completed a filler question where they
rated the pleasantness of the word.  
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using SPSS (ver. 22) and ANOVAs were 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. Recognition performance was examined 
using the signal detection sensitivity measure Az. Recognition sensitivity, Az, 
measures one’s ability to distinguish old items from new ones and ranges 
from 0 to 1 with chance performance at 0.5. Unlike most measures of 
recognition performance, this measure is largely unaffected by response bias
and is computed as the area under the hit rate by false alarm rate curve 
where each confidence response from highest to lowest confidence is treated
as an “old” response (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Memory performance for 
incidental details (i.e., color and point-value) was near chance, thus these 
data were excluded from analysis. 
Results
Recognition Performance and Directed-Forgetting
Participants achieved a relatively high overall recognition sensitivity, 
measured with Az (M = .81, SD = .07), due to having a fair hit rate (M = .72, 
SD = .13) and a low false alarm rate (M = .21, SD = .11). A robust main 
effect of cue was observed, F(1,31) = 83.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .73, such that 
TBR items (M = .82, SD = .07) were recognized with higher sensitivity than 
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TBF items (M = .73, SD = .07). Thus, the cue was effective in modifying 
encoding. Item-value was also effective in modifying encoding, as high-value 
TBR items (M = .83, SD = .08) were recognized with higher sensitivity than 
low-value TBR items (M = .81, SD = .07), F(1,31) = 4.78, p = .037, ηp2 = .13. 
Effects of Elaborative Encoding
To determine the extent that elaborative encoding contributed to 
value-directed remembering, we next examined the effects of Cue and Delay
for high-value and low-value items (Figure 2). A significant Value x Cue x 
Delay interaction was observed, F(1,31) = 5.19, p = .030, ηp2 = .14. For high-
value items, most importantly, the Cue x Delay interaction was not 
significant, F(1,31) = 0.06, p = .802, ηp2 < .01, though a substantial main 
effect of Cue was observed, F(1,31) = 50.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .62, such that 
TBR items were better remembered than TBF items. Sensitivity did not 
significantly differ between valuable TBR items paired with an immediate or 
delayed learn cue, t(31) = 0.91, p = .371, d = 0.17. These results indicate 
that participants better remembered valuable items associated with a learn 
cue, but that having that cue immediately after learning, thus allowing for 
the maximum amount of elaborative encoding, did not significantly affect 
later retrieval. 
When examining low-value items, a significant main effect of Cue was 
again observed, F(1,31) = 46.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .60, such that TBR items 
were better remembered than TBF items. Although a significant Cue x Delay 
interaction was observed, F(1,31) = 8.14, p = .008, ηp2 = .21, this was 
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
 FORGET ME NOT  15
largely due to performance differences for TBF items as no significant 
difference was observed between low-value items given an immediate or 
delayed learn cue, t(31) = 1.04, p = .306, d = 0.21.
Automatic Effects of Value on Memory
Relatively automatic contributions to value-directed remembering were
examined by looking at performance for items paired with an immediate 
“Forget” cue (Figure 3). Greater recognition sensitivity was observed for 
high-value items than low-value items followed by an immediate forget cue, 
t(31) = 2.87, p = .007, d = 0.51. Note that both high-value items, t(31) = 
14.38, p < .001, d = 2.54 and low-value items, t(31) = 7.78, p < .001, d = 
1.38 were recognized with better than chance performance. 
Discussion
Participants showed strong directed-forgetting, suggesting that this 
manipulation was effective in altering encoding. Perhaps most importantly, 
we observed a strong value-directed remembering effect for items paired 
with an immediate forget cue. As deliberate encoding is substantially 
reduced with an immediate forget cue (Bjork, 1989; Wylie, Fox, & Taylor, 
2008), this suggests that a relatively automatic process is contributing to 
value’s effect on memory. One candidate mechanism is that valuable items 
are producing increased activity in reward-related dopaminergic systems, 
and this activity enhances encoding of these items. Prior work in healthy 
subjects has shown enhanced memory for items presented in temporal 
proximity to rewards (Murayama & Kitagami, 2014), consistent with the idea 
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that the presentation of unexpected reward increases dopamine release in 
hippocampus, enhancing encoding of proximal material. In a neuroimaging 
study of value-directed remembering, younger adults were shown to have 
increased activity in midbrain dopaminergic regions in response to the value 
cue (Cohen et al., 2016) consistent with the hypothesized role of this system 
in value effects on memory.
Contrary to our predictions, we did not observe a significant increase in
recognition sensitivity when participants were given an immediate cue to 
remember the word, thus prolonging the period for elaborative encoding. 
Although TBR items were much more likely to be remembered than TBF 
items, performance did not significantly differ whether the cue came 
immediately after the word or after a 5 s delay. When the cue was presented
after the delay, there was only 1 s until the next word appeared. It seems 
unlikely that 1 s of encoding was enough to fully use more complex 
elaborative strategies such as mental imagery or putting items into a 
sentence. Although studies involving multiple study-test lists with feedback 
find that participants selectively apply elaborative strategies based on item-
value (Ariel, Price, & Hertzog, 2015; Cohen et al., 2017) it may be that such 
differences in elaboration are less pronounced when learning a single list 
without intermittent feedback. This feedback may help them develop more 
selective encoding strategies (Cohen et al., 2017). Thus, participants may 
have engaged primarily in maintenance rehearsal in all conditions except the
immediate forget condition. We also only observed a significant benefit of 
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increased maintenance rehearsal for low-value items (see Supplemental 
Data); this manipulation may have counteracted the common strategy of 
deliberately ignoring items of low value during the study phase (Ariel, Price, 
& Hertzog, 2015; Robison & Unsworth, 2017).   
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we found evidence of relatively automatic 
enhancement of encoding of high-value words, in that these words were 
recognized better than low-value words after an immediate “Forget” cue. 
Effects of value were relatively small for conditions in which participants 
were instructed to remember items, suggesting that value did not affect 
encoding strategies. However, a limitation of Experiment 1 was that the 
directed-forgetting manipulation may have discouraged participants from 
differentially engaging in effortful encoding strategies. Participants may have
focused attention on whether or not the items were TBR or TBF and they 
may have found it too demanding to also vary encoding strategy by value. In
order to assess whether participants are able to engage in elaborative 
encoding of high-value items, in Experiment 2 we removed the directed-
forgetting manipulation and instead simply instructed participants to learn 
using different encoding strategies. In three between-subjects groups, 
participants were either given no instruction regarding what strategy to use 
or they were instructed to use a mental rehearsal strategy or a mental 
imagery strategy for all learned items. After recognition testing, participants 
reported whether they adhered to their assigned strategy. We hypothesized 
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that if differences in recognition accuracy between high- and low-value items
were due in part to differences in the depth of encoding, instructing 
participants to encode all learned items with an elaborative mental imagery 
strategy would mitigate these differences. Our previous work has shown that
high-value items are more likely to be recollected at test (Hennessee, Castel,
& Knowlton, 2017; Hennessee, Knowlton, & Castel, 2018). Thus, if 
participants were achieving superior recollection of high-value items because
of differential use of elaborative encoding strategies, we predicted that 
instructing participants to use a mental imagery strategy for all learned 
items would reduce this difference in recollection. Alternatively, if the effects 
of value are restricted to automatic strengthening of memory 
representations, there may continue to be a difference between high-value 
and low-value items, even though overall recognition may be better when 
this elaborative encoding task is used. To assess recollection, we used a 
Remember-Know-Guess design where participants introspected whether 
each item they classified as “old” was accompanied by recollection of the 
study episode including associated details (Remember response), a strong 
sense of familiarity (Know response), or whether their recognition response 
was a guess (Gardiner & Ramponi, 1998; Tulving, 1985). We also assessed 
memory for the highest confidence responses (‘Definitely Old’) as there are 
appreciable differences between confidence and recollection (Gardiner & 
Java, 1990) that may also lead these responses to be differentially affected 
by encoding strategy. In this way, we were able to assess whether value 
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affected the quality of recognition and how this compared with the effect of 
encoding instruction.
Method
Participants
Data from 108 UCLA undergraduate students were collected for this 
experiment. 
Participants in the rehearsal and imagery conditions who reported using the 
pertinent strategy less than 50% of the time were excluded from all 
analyses, leaving 36 participants in the No Instruction condition, 20 
participants in the Mental Rehearsal condition, and 24 participants in the 
Mental Imagery condition. Our key findings for Experiment 2 were largely 
replicated when using a stricter exclusion criteria of 80% strategy use 
(Supplemental Data). This final sample of 80 students (59 females and 21 
males) had an age range of 18-27 years (M = 20.20, SD = 1.64). This sample
size was selected as it would allow for an approximate power of .85 to detect
a medium-sized instruction condition by value interaction, as computed 
using GPower. These participants completed the study for course credit. 
Informed consent was acquired and the study was completed in accordance 
with UCLA’s Institutional Review Board. 
Materials
Stimuli included 96 English nouns, and the first letter of each word was
capitalized. All words were drawn from clusters 7 and 8 of the Toglia and 
Battig (1978) word norms, as these clusters were high in imagability. Words 
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were selected to have similar imagability (M = 5.66, SD = 0.40, range: 4.75-
6.61), concreteness (M = 5.75, SD = 0.37, range: 4.50-6.48), and number of 
letters (M = 5.78, SD = 0.73, range: 5-7). During encoding, 48 of these words
were randomly presented and paired with a point-value of 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, or 
12 to the right of the word. These values were chosen to maintain a large 
difference between low-value (1-3 pts.) and high-value (10-12 pts.) items and
yet to provide a larger range of values than Experiment 1. This wider 
selection of point-values was also used to make the work more comparable 
to recent examinations of value and memory (Cohen et al., 2016; 
Hennessee, Knowlton, & Castel, 2018). Whether an item was assigned to be 
low-value, high-value, or a new item at test was counterbalanced across 
participants. During the recognition test all 96 words (half new) were 
presented in random order in black on a white background screen without a 
point-value. All materials were presented on a desktop computer with the E-
prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA; 
https://www.psnet.com). All words were presented in 32 pt. Arial font.     
Procedure
Participants completed the study individually in a private computer lab.
They were told they would view a large selection of words, each paired with 
a point-value they would earn if they could remember the item, and that 
their goal was to earn a high score. Instructions regarding how they should 
learn items were varied between-subjects. The No Instruction condition was 
not provided instruction as to which strategy to use, the Mental Rehearsal 
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condition was instructed to think of the word repeatedly (e.g., “Knight, 
Knight, Knight, . . .”), and the Mental Imagery condition was asked to picture 
in mind what the item looks like. During the encoding phase, participants 
were presented with 48 words that were each on screen for 2 s and with a 1 
s fixation cross between words. After encoding, participants completed seven
multiplication and division problems as a distractor task. Afterwards, they 
were instructed regarding the meaning of Remembering, Knowing, and 
Guessing with instructions adapted from Gardiner and Java (1990; see 
Appendix A). Participants were asked to explain what Remembering meant in
the context of this study, and corrected if their response was deemed 
unsatisfactory.  
Finally, participants completed a self-paced recognition test including 
96 words (half new). Participants were told they would lose 2 points for 
incorrect responses to discourage labeling all items as old. Participants first 
rated how confident they were that each item was presented before on the 
6-point scale described in Experiment 1 (1 “Definitely New” to 6 “Definitely 
Old”).  For items rated as old (4-6), they reported whether they recognized 
the item due to Remembering, Knowing, or Guessing. For items rated as new
(1-3), they completed a filler question where they rated the pleasantness of 
the word. This filler question was added to prevent participants from rating 
items as new to reduce the duration of the experiment. At the end, 
participants were asked to rate the proportion of time (0-100% in 10-percent 
increments) they used the following strategies: (a) mental imagery, (b) 
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mental rehearsal, (c), putting items into a sentence. These three ratings 
were made independently, so the proportion of time spent using these 
strategies was not required to sum to 100%. These strategies were targeted 
because Ariel, Price, and Hertzog (2015) found that they were commonly 
used.  
Results
Strategy Use
First, the reported proportion of time participants used each strategy 
was examined to determine how well they followed instructions (Figure 4). 
The relationship between the encoding condition and use of the three 
strategies was examined using a 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA. A 
significant Condition x Strategy interaction was observed, F(4, 145) = 6.86, p
< .001, ηp2 = .15. In the Rehearsal condition, using rehearsal was 
significantly more common than the other two strategies (all p’s ≤ .002). 
Likewise, in the Mental Imagery condition, using imagery was significantly 
more common than the other two strategies (all p’s ≤ .005). Finally, the No 
Instruction condition was examined to better understand normal strategy use
on this value-directed remembering task. In this condition, rehearsal was the
most common strategy (all 
p’s ≤ .034), though mental imagery was also quite common and was used 
more frequently than putting items into a sentence, t(34) = 3.03, p = .005, d
= 0.51.
Memory Performance
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The influences of encoding condition and item-value on recognition 
sensitivity (Az) were examined using a 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
(Figure 5; Table 1). The Condition x Value interaction only showed a trend, 
F(2, 77) = 2.54, p = .085, ηp2 = .06. However, a follow-up ANOVA comparing 
sensitivity between the No Instruction and Mental Imagery condition did 
show a significant Condition x Value interaction, F(1, 58) = 4.41, p = .040, 
ηp2 = .07. In the No Instruction condition, sensitivity was considerably higher 
for high-value items than low-value items, t(35) = 4.38, p < .001, d = 0.74. 
In the Rehearsal condition, sensitivity was also significantly higher for high-
value items than low-value items, t(19) = 3.61, p = .002, d = 0.82. In the 
Mental Imagery condition, the value effect on sensitivity was smaller though 
still significant, t(23) = 2.11, p = .046, d = 0.47. Differences in sensitivity by 
value were considerably reduced in the Mental Imagery condition largely 
because although the sensitivity to low-value items significantly improved 
compared with the No Instruction condition, t(58) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 0.91,
high-value items only showed a trend for improvement, t(58) = 1.93, p = .
058, d = 0.51.
We then examined influences of encoding condition and item-value on 
the proportion of items given the highest confidence response (‘Definitely 
Old’). The 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant interaction 
of value and condition, F(2, 77) = 4.31, p = .017, ηp2 = .10. In the No 
Instruction condition, ‘Definitely Old’ responses were given to a significantly 
higher proportion of high-value items (M = .54, SD = .21) than low-value 
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items (M = .34, SD = .20), t(35) = 5.17, p < .001, d = 0.86. Likewise, in the 
Rehearsal condition, ‘Definitely Old’ responses were more common for high-
value items (M = .55, SD = .23) than low-value items (M = .34, SD = .17), 
t(19) = 3.72, p = .001, d = 0.84. However, in the Mental Imagery condition, 
the proportion of items given a ‘Definitely Old’ response did not significantly 
differ between high-value (M = .67, SD = .20) and low-value items (M = .62, 
SD = .19), t(23) = 1.47, p = .156, d = 0.30. Unlike recognition sensitivity, the
highest confidence responses increased in frequency in the imagery 
condition both for low-value items t(58) = 5.53, p < .001, d = 1.46, and 
valuable items, t(58) = 2.43, p = .018, d = 0.65.     
Experiences of Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing
To examine whether the proportion of correctly recognized old items 
given a Remember, Know, or Guess response differed as a function of item-
value and encoding condition (Figure 6; Table 1), a 3 x 2 x 3 repeated 
measures ANOVA was computed. The Memory type (R-K-G) x Condition x 
Value interaction was not found to be significant, F(2, 77) = 1.54, p = .221, 
ηp2 = .04. A significant Memory type x Condition interaction was observed, 
F(2, 77) = 11.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. Additionally, a significant Memory Type
x Value interaction was observed, F(1, 77) = 7.32, p = .008, ηp2 = .09. 
Posthoc analyses revealed that valuable items were more likely than low-
value items to receive a Remember response at test, t(79) = 3.85, p < .001, 
d = 0.43, and less likely to receive a Guess response, t(79) = -3.92, p < .001,
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d = -0.46. The proportion of recognized items that received a Know response
did not significantly differ by value, t(79) = 1.31, p = .193, d = 0.15.   
Next, we examined how the proportion of items given a Remember 
response in the Mental Imagery condition compared with the No Instruction 
condition. We observed a significant Value x Condition interaction, F(1, 58) =
4.15, p = .046, ηp2 = .07. More specifically, in the No Instruction condition, 
recognized high-value items were more likely to receive a Remember 
response than low-value items, t(35) = 3.71, p = .001, d = 0.62. But, the 
frequency of Remember responses did not significantly differ by value in the 
Mental Imagery condition, t(23) = 0.74, p = .467, d = 0.15. Interestingly, the
Mental Imagery condition showed higher rates of remembering than the No 
Instruction condition both for high-value items, t(58) = 3.52, p = .001, d = 
0.96 and low-value items, t(58) = 5.53, p < .001, d = 1.47.    
Discussion
A key finding was that instructing participants to learn all items using 
mental imagery mitigated value’s enhancement of recognition. In contrast, 
valuable items were recognized and recollected at significantly higher levels 
than less valuable words when participants primarily used a less effective 
mental rehearsal strategy. Value-based differences in recognition sensitivity 
were substantially reduced in the Mental Imagery condition, and the 
frequency of highest confidence responses and recollection did not differ 
significantly by item-value because performance was sharply enhanced for 
low-value items. These results support the idea that participants are 
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engaging in more elaborative encoding of high-value words, as the value 
effect was nearly eliminated when participants were instructed to engage in 
elaborative encoding of low-value words as well. The small effect of value 
that remained may have resulted from automatic effects of value as 
described in Experiment 1. In the other conditions, subjects reported 
primarily using a less effective rehearsal strategy, and recognition was 
significantly better for high-value words, and this effect of value was much 
greater than for the mental imagery condition. It is possible that in these 
conditions, an automatic enhancement of encoding occurred for high-value 
words. It is also possible that participants did engage in some elaborative 
encoding for high-value words, as they reported using deeper encoding 
strategies for some of the time. This interpretation is consistent with our 
prior neuroimaging work showing that participants with high value-related 
selectivity in memory show increased activity in left hemisphere semantic 
processing regions when encoding valuable items (Cohen et al., 2014). 
Experiment 3
To further examine the role of differential encoding in value-directed 
remembering, we replicated Experiment 2 using a new encoding 
manipulation. Our primary goal was to determine whether using another 
type of deep encoding, such as putting all items into sentences, would also 
mitigate value’s effect on recognition. Additionally, one limitation of 
Experiment 2 was that there was some ambiguity as to how well participants
followed their encoding instructions, so we incorporated a more easily 
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monitored encoding strategy manipulation. To examine value effects when 
all items are shallowly encoding, we replaced the Mental Rehearsal condition
with a Consonant Counting condition where participants had to report out 
loud whether each word at encoding had an even or odd number of 
consonants. To examine value effects during deep encoding, the Mental 
Imagery condition was replaced with a Sentence Generation condition where 
participants had to generate and say aloud a sentence incorporating the 
current word. Consonant counting and sentence generation were selected as
manipulations as they have previously been shown to encourage shallow and
deep encoding, respectively, as evident by recognition performance (Smith, 
MacLeod, Bain, & Hoppe, 1989). Importantly, experimenters can easily 
monitor participant engagement in these two encoding methods.  
Method
Participants
Data from 108 UCLA undergraduate students were collected for this 
experiment. Seven participants were excluded for failing to count consonants
or generate sentences out loud for at least 80% of encoding trials, resulting 
in a final sample size of 101. There were 36 participants in the No Instruction
condition, 31 in the Consonant Counting condition, and 34 in the Sentence 
Generation Condition. This sample included 78 females and 23 males with an
age range of 18-36 (M = 20.85, SD = 2.36). Participants gave informed 
consent and completed the study for course credit.
Materials and Procedure
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Experiment 3 was designed using the same materials and procedure 
as Experiment 2 but with new encoding instructions. As in Experiment 2, 
participants viewed 48 words at encoding and 96 words at test (half old). At 
encoding, items were paired with either a low-value (1-3 pts.) or high-value 
(10-12 pts.). Item-value and whether each word was presented at encoding 
or as a new item during testing was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were told that they would view a large series of words and to 
remember words with the goal of earning a high score. Stimulus presentation
time was increased from 2 s per word to 3 s per word in order to provide 
sufficient time to complete the assigned encoding task. As before, we 
collected confidence judgments and Remember, Know, and Guess responses 
at test. 
Prior to encoding, participants were given one of three sets of encoding
instructions that were manipulated between-subjects. In the No Instruction 
group, participants received no further instruction after being told their goal 
was to earn a high score. In the Counting Consonants group, participants 
were told to mentally tally how many consonants were in a word and say out 
loud whether that number was odd or even (e.g., rivers, “four”). In the 
Sentence Generation group, participants were asked to use the word in a 
short sentence. For these last two conditions, participants were given a 
single practice trial to ensure they understood the instructions. The 
experimenter reminded participants to follow this encoding procedure when 
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necessary and recorded instances of participants not saying their answers 
aloud for at least 80% of encoding trials.  
Results
Memory Performance
A 3 x 2 ANOVA indicated that there was a Condition x Value interaction
in predicting recognition sensitivity (Az; Figure 7; Table 2), F(2, 98) = 5.55, p 
= .005, ηp2 = .10. In the No Instruction condition, sensitivity was significantly 
higher for high-value items relative to low-value items, t(35) = 3.45, p = .
001, d = 0.58. However, sensitivity did not significantly differ between high-
value and low-value items for the Consonant Counting condition, t(30) = 
0.08, p = .937, d = 0.01, nor for the Sentence Generation condition, t(33) = 
0.73, p = .471, d = 0.13. Compared with the No Instruction condition, 
Consonant Counting produced worse memory for high-value items, t(65) = 
-4.06, p < .001, d = -0.99, but not low-value items, t(65) = -1.37, p = .176, d
= -0.33. Compared with the No Instruction condition, Sentence Generation 
produced both better sensitivity for high-value items, t(68) = 3.54, p = .001, 
d = 0.87, and low-value items, t(68) = 5.03, p < .001, d = 1.23.
Next, we examined influences of encoding condition and value on the 
proportion of items recognized with highest confidence (‘Definitely Old’). A 3 
x 2 repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there was a significant 
Condition x Value interaction, F(2, 98) = 11.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. In the No 
Instruction condition, ‘Definitely Old’ responses were given to a significantly 
greater proportion of high-value items (M = .56, SD = .24) than low-value 
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items (M = .38, SD = .24), t(35) = 4.09, p < .001, d = 0.68. In the Consonant
Counting condition, the proportion of ‘Definitely Old’ responses did not differ 
between high-value (M = .29, SD = .21) and low-value items (M = .29, SD = .
23), t(30) = -0.29, p = .772, d = -0.03. Lastly, in the Sentence Generation 
condition, the proportion of ‘Definitely Old’ responses also did not differ 
between high-value (M = .89, SD = .16) and low-value items (M = .88, SD = .
16), t(33) = 0.58, p = .567, d = 0.10. As with recognition sensitivity, the 
highest confidence responses became much more frequent in the Sentence 
Generation condition, both for low-value items, t(68) = 10.06, p < .001, d = 
2.47, and valuable items, t(68) = 6.66, p < .001, d = 1.63.     
Experiences of Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing
A 3 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was computed to determine 
how the proportion of correctly recognized old items given a Remember, 
Know, or Guess response was affected by item-value and encoding condition 
(Figure 8; Table 2). The Memory Type (R-K-G) x Condition x Value interaction 
was significant, F(2, 98) = 4.86, p = .001, ηp2 = .09. Significant two-way 
interactions were observed for Memory Type x Condition, F(2, 98) = 31.12, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .39, and Memory Type x Value, F(2, 98) = 7.68, p = .001, ηp2 
= .07. As was observed in Experiment 2, high-value items were more likely 
to receive a Remember response than low-value items, t(100) = 3.26, p = .
002, d = 0.33, and less likely to receive a Guess response, t(100) = -3.08, p 
= .003, d = -0.31. The frequency of Know responses did not significantly 
differ by item-value, t(100) = 0.55, p = .587, d = 0.05.   
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The proportion of items given a Remember response was then 
compared between the Sentence Generation and No Instruction conditions. A
significant Value x Condition interaction was observed, F(1, 68) = 8.47, p = .
005, ηp2 = .11. In the No Instruction condition, recognized high-value items 
were more likely to receive a Remember response than low-value items, 
t(35) = 3.50, p = .001, d = 0.59. In contrast, in the Sentence Generation 
condition rates of Remember responses did not significantly differ between 
the two item values, t(33) = 0.79, p = .434, d = 0.14. The Sentence 
Generation condition showed higher rates of Remember responses than the 
No Instruction condition both for high-value items, t(68) = 5.87, p < .001, d 
= 1.42 and low-value items, t(68) = 7.78, p < .001, d = 1.89.    
Discussion
The primary goal of Experiment 3 was to determine whether a different
deep encoding strategy (sentence generation) would also mitigate value’s 
effect on recognition, as mental imagery was found to do in Experiment 2. 
Recognition sensitivity, frequency of highest confidence responses, and 
frequency of recollection did not differ significantly by item-value when 
participants were instructed to generate sentences for both low- and high-
value items, supporting the idea that differences in recognition accuracy 
based on value are likely due to differences in depth of encoding. The results
from the Counting Consonants condition support this idea as well. In this 
condition, participants had limited ability to employ deep encoding strategies
for high-value items, and their recognition memory for high-value items was 
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not significantly better than their recognition memory for low-value items. 
Recognition memory for both high- and low-value items in the Consonant 
Counting condition was similar to recognition memory for low-value items in 
the No Instruction condition, suggesting this level of performance is 
supported by simply reading the words without engaging with them on a 
deeper semantic level. In contrast, the level of performance for both high- 
and low-value items in the sentence generation condition was markedly 
higher than the level of performance for the high-value items in the No 
Instruction condition. This suggests that sentence generation is a more 
effective encoding strategy than participants typically use for learning high-
value items, consistent with the relatively low levels of self-reported use of 
this strategy in the No Instruction condition in Experiment 2.
General Discussion
Relatively Automatic Contributions to Value-Directed Remembering
Across three experiments, the contributions of relatively automatic and
elaborative encoding processes to value–directed remembering were 
examined. A key result of this study was that value can enhance recognition 
in a relatively automatic fashion, even when subjects are immediately told 
that the item is irrelevant. In Experiment 1, when items were paired with an 
immediate forget cue, participants showed stronger recognition sensitivity 
for valuable items than low-value items. The large directed-forgetting effect 
observed in this study suggests that an immediate forget cue effectively 
reduced intentional encoding of items; thus, the most plausible explanation 
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for these results is that a less deliberate and relatively automatic process is 
enhancing the learning of valuable items. 
One plausible mechanism by which valuable items may be 
automatically strengthened in memory is that these items activate midbrain 
dopaminergic circuitry that can enhance hippocampal activity (Bethus, Tse, 
& Morris, 2010; Rossato et al., 2009). High-value cues elicit activity in 
dopaminergic regions and this dopamine release appears to signal the 
anticipation of rewards (Adcock et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, this dopaminergic signaling has been shown to act directly on 
the hippocampus to upregulate the storage of information in long-term 
memory (Lisman & Grace, 2005; Otmakhova, Duzel, Deutsch, & Lisman, 
2013; Rossato et al., 2009). Neuroimaging of value-directed remembering 
has revealed that activation of bilateral nucleus accumbens, a component of 
the midbrain dopaminergic reward system, does coincide with high point-
value cues (Cohen et al., 2014). In a previous study, the presentation of 
rewards strengthened subsequent memory for information that was proximal
to these rewards, consistent with the idea that value can automatically 
enhance memory independent of motivation to remember (Murayama & 
Kitagami, 2014). In a similar vein, Cohen et al. (2017) showed that effects of 
value were present on a free recall task, even when subjects reported that 
they did not attend to value and attempted to encode all items in a similar 
fashion. 
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One difference between the current study and much of previous work 
showing activation of the midbrain dopamine system is that these previous 
effects were mainly apparent after a delay of at least 12 hours, suggesting 
that the effect of dopamine is to enhance memory consolidation (Bethus, 
Tse, & Morris, 2010; Rossato et al., 2009; Spaniol, Schain, & Bowen, 2013). In
the present study, small effects of value were seen on a recognition test that
occurred shortly after study, and these immediate effects of value have been
observed in previous research (Hennessee, Castel, & Knowlton, 2017; 
Hennessee, Knowlton, & Castel, 2018). In the current study, we used a fairly 
sensitive measure of recognition, and thus it is possible that we were able to 
detect relatively subtle value effects on memory strength. It may be that 
there would be larger value effects with a long delay due to enhanced 
consolidation of these items. Thus, relatively small differences in memory 
strength due to value may become magnified if there is differential 
consolidation of higher-strength items. 
Contributions of Elaborative Encoding
Other work has suggested that high-value cues promoted increased 
elaborative semantic processing of items which leads to better subsequent 
memory. Research by Cohen et al. (2016) suggests that value-directed 
remembering promotes increased activity in left VLPFC, pre-supplementary 
motor area, and posterior lateral temporal cortex, and these regions have 
been implicated in deep semantic processing (Binder et al., 2009; Binder and
Desai, 2011). In Experiment 1, we did not observe a significant effect of 
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prolonged elaborative encoding on recognition for high- or low-value words. 
More specifically, when the learn cue was presented immediately, 
participants had the maximal amount of time (6 s) to use any encoding 
strategy they preferred, but this was not shown to improve performance 
relative to seeing the cue only 1 s before the next item. At first glance, this 
seems at odds with prior research showing that people selectively use 
effective strategies for valuable word-pairs (Ariel, Price, & Hertzog, 2015) 
and they alter their strategy use based on item-value (Cohen et al., 2017). 
Likewise, this seems to go against the agenda-based regulation model (Ariel,
Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009), as the longer study time should allow for larger 
differences in allocating time, resources, and effort based on item-value. 
However, as shown in Cohen et al. (2017), participants often require multiple
study-test lists with feedback on their performance to fully develop this 
value-related selectivity in encoding. Ariel, Price, and Hertzog (2015) and 
Cohen et al. (2017) used multiple lists with feedback, whereas the present 
study did not. Thus it is possible that our participants did not have sufficient 
feedback on performance to develop selective encoding strategies observed 
in studies with multiple study-test lists. The contribution of elaborative 
encoding strategies on value-directed remembering may be relatively small 
when studying a single recognition list without intermittent feedback. 
Nevertheless, in Experiment 2, there was evidence of differential 
encoding strategies for valuable items. Unlike in Experiment 1, participants 
in Experiment 2 did not have to engage in directed-forgetting, and thus it 
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may have been easier to adopt different encoding strategies depending on 
value. A strong value effect on recognition was observed in the maintenance 
rehearsal condition, and this value effect was not significantly different than 
when no instruction was present. In these conditions, valuable items may 
have been automatically encoded more effectively, or participants may have 
strategically engaged in more effective encoding of these items. Even when 
participants were instructed to engage in rehearsal, it is possible that they 
were able to also engage in more semantic encoding of some items, as 
participants generally reported using more than one strategy during the 
encoding session. In support of the idea that participants engage in more 
semantic encoding strategies for high-value items, instructing participants to
encode all learned items using a mental imagery strategy improved memory 
for low-value items to the point that value-based differences in sensitivity 
were reduced and differences in the rates of highest confidence response 
and Remember responses were eliminated. In a recent study, item-value was
associated with increased experiences of recollection but the frequency of 
high confidence responses was not significantly affected by value 
(Hennessee, Castel, & Knowlton, 2017). The current findings suggest that 
value can alter the frequency of these high confidence responses and that 
mental imagery during encoding may increase both confidence and 
recollection similarly at test.  
The results of Experiment 3 support and extend the results of 
Experiment 2. A limitation of Experiment 2 was that use of the instructed 
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encoding strategy was reported by participants at the end of the experiment 
rather than monitored directly. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we required 
participants in the Sentence Generation and Counting Consonants conditions
to respond aloud, which allowed us to monitor whether they were following 
the encoding instructions they had been assigned. Under these 
circumstances, we did not observe any effects of value on recognition, 
supporting the idea that differential encoding makes a strong contribution to 
value effects. It is possible that we were not able to detect automatic effects 
of value in the Sentence Generation condition because recognition sensitivity
was near ceiling; however, we observed a similar pattern of results when 
looking at the proportion of items rated as Remembered, which was quite 
high but not at ceiling. It is also possible that the numerical task of counting 
consonants interfered with processing of word values. Replication of this 
result with a non-numerical task that similarly limits differential strategy use 
would provide additional support for our findings.
In Cohen et al. (2014), neuroimaging data indicated differences in 
activation in semantic processing regions between high-value and low-value 
items, and we observed that differences in performance were mitigated 
when participants increase their semantic processing of low-value items 
through mental imagery and sentence generation. Taken together, these two
studies suggest that differences in semantic processing based on item-value 
contribute to value-directed remembering, though this contribution is likely 
greater when participants receive feedback through multiple lists. 
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Conclusions
Across three experiments we demonstrated that value can improve 
recognition in both a relatively automatic fashion as well as by inducing 
participants to engage in more effective encoding. The current findings, 
together with prior research, suggest that valuable items receive increased 
semantic processing. Further research may determine how learners adjust 
and apply encoding strategies to maximize memory efficiency.
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Appendix A
Remember-Know-Guess Instructions (Adapted from Gardiner & Java,
1990)
Soon you will be shown a series of individual words and asked if you 
recognize the word from the studying phase or if it is a new word. For words 
you recognize, you will also be asked whether you recognized it due to 
remembering, knowing, or guessing. Now, I will describe what we mean by 
remembering and knowing:
Often, when remembering a previous event or occurrence, we 
consciously recollect and become aware of aspects of the previous 
experience.  At other times, we simply know that something has occurred 
before, but without being able consciously to recollect anything about its 
occurrence or what we experienced at the time.  For example, if seeing a 
hammer reminds you that you nailed up a picture frame a few days ago, and 
you can remember what it was like nailing up that picture, you would label 
that remembering. In contrast, if someone asks you what a hammer is, and 
you are certain you know what hammers are, but you can’t remember any 
specific experiences with a hammer, you would call that knowing. The key 
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distinction, again, is that in remembering you can recall a specific 
experience, whereas in knowing you cannot.
Before we go on, can you tell me what it means to remember given my
earlier definition?
Today, remembering means that you consciously recall having seen 
the word previously in this study, and this can include any details related 
with that experience. This could be visual, such as being able to remember 
vividly what the word looks like. Also, if seeing the word earlier made you 
think of anything, and you can remember that on the recognition task, we 
will label that remembering. Now, please only give a remember response if 
you are sure that you have this conscious experience. In contrast, knowing 
means that you are certain you saw the word before, but you are unable to 
consciously remember the experience. A third response, guessing, will 
indicate that you are uncertain that you saw the word before.
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